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COSTS OF
CIGARETTES
The first criticism is that the proposed
resolution would not require
manufacturers and, in tum, consumers
to pay anything approaching the true
total costs of cigarettes, costs that we
estimate to be at least $7 per pack, a
number that is considerably higher than
other estimates that have been reported
in the media. Our estimate includes
some, but not all, of the costs borne
ultimately by smokers themselves, by
smokers' insurers, and by individuals
injured by second-hand smoke. It
includes only future costs and excludes
many of those. So, for example, the
figure includes neither the health-care
costs that have previously been caused
by smoking nor the future pain-and
suffering costs borne by smokers or
family members of deceased smokers.
Unlike most economists who have
previously attempted to measure the
costs of cigarettes, we do not reduce our
estimate of cigarette costs to take into
account the "savings" resulting from
cigarette-induced premature deaths.
Those savings - measured mostly in the
form of smokers' unclaimed pension and
nursing-home entitlements - may not
in fact be real, and in any event, are not
relevant to the questions of whether and
how best to regulate the market for
cigarettes.
We should make clear that the
purpose of the $7 per pack figure is not
to suggest that a tax of $7 per pack
should be imposed or that, following the
introduction of the sort of regulatory
regime we suggest below, cigarette prices
will rise by $7 per pack. Rather, it is
meant only to suggest the magnitude of
the need for some type of regulatory
intervention. In fact, under the smokers'
compensation regime that we
recommend, we would for a number of
reasons that we cannot pursue here
expect cigarette prices to rise by no more
than $3 per pack.
7
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probably most accurate to understand
the three categories of regulation as
demarcating three points along a

IDENTIFYING

continuum, with command-and-control
regulation at one end, incentive-based
regulation at the other end, and
performance-based regulation
somewhere in between. Nevertheless, it
is useful to maintain the conceptual
distinctions among the three types of
regulation to enable us to identify the

APPROPRIATE
REGULATORY

costs and benefits of moving in one
direction or the other along the
continuum.
Under command-and-control
regulation, sometimes called "input

RESPONSE

regulation, " the regulator imposes
specific requirements on the firm. The
regulator in effect tells the regulated firm
how specifically to run some aspect of its
business. In regulating pollution, for

The proposed resolution is implicitly
premised on the assumption that some
form of intervention in the cigarette
market is necessary In light of evidence
that smokers typically begin their habits
at a very early age, tend not to be well
informed of the long-term health risks of
smoking, often underestimate
addictiveness of cigarettes, and often do
not bear many of the costs associated
with smoking, we agree that the market
for cigarettes should not be left
unregulated. Our second criticism of the
proposed resolution, however, is that the
regulatory regime that it would
implement is almost exactly the inverse
of what it should be. To understand that
criticism, it is helpful to step back from
the proposal itself and ask a more general
question (a question that, curiously, has
evaded scholars and commentators to
this point): What is the best approach to
regulating cigarettes?

A.

Three categories of regulation
Regulatory scholars have, in broad

terms, identified three general categories
of regulation: command-and-control
regulation; performance-based regulation;
and incentive-based regulation. The
distinctions we draw among the three
types of regulation are not perfect and
can, in some instances, begin to blur.
Thus, some examples of performance
based regulation begin to look like
incentive-based regulation. In fact, it is

example, the command-and-control
regulator might prescribe specific steps
that manufacturers must take, or specific
technologies that they must use, in order
to reduce the level of pollution that is
emitted by their manufacturing
processes.
There are many examples of
command-and-control regulation in the
proposed resolution. For example, the
warning requirements and the
advertising restrictions that would be
imposed on manufacturers are best
characterized as command-and-control
regulations. Similarly, if the Food and
Drug Administration exercised its limited
auth01ity under the proposed resolution
to mandate particular "technically
feasible, " "less hazardous tobacco
products, " it would do so in the form of
command-and-control regulations.
Under performance-based regulation,
by contrast, the regulator presents
manufacturers with a target of some sort,
which the manufacturers are encouraged
to meet. That target is sometimes called a
"performance standard." The
manufacturers are then left to decide

how best to achieve that target. One
performance standard, for example,
might be a maximum quantity of
pollution that a firm is allowed to emit
over a given period of time, such as that
allowed by tradeable pollution permits.
Failure to achieve the relevant target,
however, would result in a fine or
additional regulation. The proposed
resolution contains a couple of
performance-based standards. The best
known example is the so-called "look
back" provision, which would set target
levels of underage smoking that the
industry would pay a fine for failing
to meet.
Performance-based regulation, when
compared to command-and-control
regulation, reflects a greater degree of
humility and skepticism with regard to
how much the regulator can be expected
to know about the cutting-edge
technology in a given industry and a
greater degree of reliance on the industry
(or the market) to have and act on that
information. Nevertheless, both types of
regulation make substantial informational
demands on the regulator.
If there is a performance standard or
target that is assumed to be desirable,
performance-based regulation can be
superior to command-and-control
regulation as a means of achieving that
standard, for the reason already
described - manufacturers have better
information. In addition, if we know
what the target standard is, then
enforcement of such a standard is
relatively easy (because of the ease of
monitoring compliance) compared to
enforcement of command-and-control
regulation, where the regulator must
constantly defer to the informational
advantage of the manufacturer.
Although there is something to be
said for performance-based regulation
over command-and-control regulation,
it is our view that they both impose
roughly the same informational demands
on the regulator. Although we develop
that argument in considerable detail in
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ur Arti le, th general idea is captured
in the foll wing questi n: Ho is the
perD rmance-ba ed regulat r supposed to
choose the appropriate target 1 vel of
perf rmance (or the appropriate fine for
failing to m et that target)? For
ample

forms of regulation might pr

how does Congress or EPA determine the
aggr gate le el f air or water pollution

smoking. In additi n in some non
cigarette situations (for e 'ampl , in

to permit? To answer such questions the
regulator must ha e information about
not onl

the le el of harm au ed by
different le els of p llution but also the
total social costs and benefits of the
activities that give rise to the pollution.
Inc ntiv -bas d regulation is superior
to command-and-control and
performance-based regulation inasmuch
as it requires less information of the

h lpful

as a m ans of redu ing und rage

dealing with the pr blems of air
p llution created b aut mobile
emissions), either command-and-

ntr l

performance-based, or perhaps an e cis
tax ("e

ante incenti e-based r gulati n'

may be the only a ailable opti ns. This
would be true if e

post incenti e-based

regulation (of the type we describe in
greater detail in the text below) wer
considered impractical perhaps be ause

regulator, and it relies more on the
market to generate the desired regulatory
outcomes. Under incenti e-based
regulation, the regulator simply forces
the manufacturers to pay the total costs
of their manufacturing a tivities. The

the harms associated with generalized air
pollution are too widely dispersed to gi e
rise to e

post damage claims brought by

individual victims. It should be
emphasized, however, that the cigarette
market presents a setting in which e

manufacturers are then left to decide
what to do about those costs, if anything.
Thus, incentive-based regulation does
not tell manufacturers how to run their
business (as command-and-control

post incentive-based regulation is
available as a regulatory option.
B. The problem with the
proposed resolution

regulation does). Nor does it require the
regulator to choose the ideal regulatory
target (as performance-based regulation
does). It simply makes the industry pay
its costs, and lets the market sort things
out. The general superiority of incentive
based regulation over command-and

Given this consensus in favor of
incentive-based regulation, one would
hope that any proposal to regulate
cigarettes would rely most heavily on
incentive-based approaches, with little
emphasis on command-and-control and
performance-based regulation. In fact,

control regulation in most settings is

however, the proposed resolution takes

fairly widely accepted among scholars

just the opposite approach. It is

and is increasingly recognized by policy

dominated by a renewed and

makers. Indeed, most of the important

strengthened emphasis on command

debates in environmental regulation

and-control regulation, including

seem to be over, not whether to use

everything from new warning

market forces, but how best to use

requirements to new FDA control over

market forces as a means of reducing

the level of nicotine and other

pollution.

ingredients in tobacco products. And the

It is not our position that command
and-control and performance-based

proposed resolution is especially
remarkable for its lack of incentive-based

regulation should never be used. There

regulatory approaches. In fact, by sharply

are circumstances in which those types of

curtailing products liability law as a

regulation may be useful supplements to

means of regulating manufacturer

ex post incentive-based regulation. We

behavior, the proposed resolution would
eliminate the only existing incentive

do take the position, however, that those
types of regulation, especially in the

based system with any potential for

cigarette context, are not viable substitutes

internalizing the external costs of

for ex post incentive-based regulation.

smoking.

Still, those regulatory alternatives can
serve a complementary function. Even in
the cigarette context for example, those
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C. The benefits of incentivebased regulation
Incentive-based regulation would
significantly reduce the problems
suggested by the preceding set of
In addition, the settlement contains
the occasional performance-based
approach - such as the "look back"
provision designed to achieve specific
targets of underage smoking by various
points in time - but those provisions,
by virtually all accounts, involve
penalties for failure to achieve the
relevant targets that are too weak.
Moreover, as we will show in the text
below, even if the penalties are increased,
the way in which the penalties would be
apportioned among tobacco companies
(essentially on a market-share basis)
would undermine each company'.s
incentives to reduce underage smoking.
To get a clearer picture of the limits of
the command-and-control and
performance-based regulations outlined
in the proposed resolution, consider the
following questions:
•What if the proposed cigarette
warnings and advertising restrictions are
ineffecti e, as they have been in the past?
•What if, in response to
requirements that they must turn over to
the FDA all research regarding potential
alternati e, potentially safer, cigarette
designs cigarette manufacturers stop
conducting such research?
•What if the FDA does identify a
cigarette design that appears likely to be
safer than on entional designs? Should

questions. It would do so by taking
government regulators out of the role of
trying to make complex economic and
scientific determinations and by relying
instead on the expertise of manufacturers
and on the power of market forces.
The proposed resolution arguably
includes an incentive-based component,
insofar as the costs imposed on
manufacturers are required to be passed
through to consumers in the form of a
price hike. That mandated price hike
would, like an excise tax, force
manufacturers to bear at least some of
the costs of their products. Viewing the
proposed regulation in that light, some
scholars have complained that the price
hike is too small. According to Jeffrey
Harris, for instance, the proposed
agreement would, if adopted, have the
effect of a $0.62 per pack excise tax on
cigarettes. In addition, some senators and
the Clinton administration ha e recently
suggested the possibility of increasing the
price hike to some amount closer to
$ 1.50 per pack. (See Jeffrey Tay lor,
'More Senators Seem to Back Increasing
Cigarette Prices Beyond Level in Accord,'
Wall Street]oumal, A4, Sept. 17, 1997.)
There appears to be an emerging
consensus among commentators and
policy makers, in other words, that the
regulatory effect of the de facto excise tax
needs to be enhanced and will ha e a

the FDA mandate it. What if smokers

greater regulatory effect than that of

increase their o erall consumption of

other aspects of the proposed resolution.

cigarettes be ause of the ne

design?

With that conclusion we agree. An

What if the safer cigarette is unpopular

e cise tax probably does ha e certain

be ause of, say, unpleasant taste

advantages over command-and-control

attributes? Should the FDA require that

or performance-based regulation.

all cigarettes adopt the new design? If

Howe er, as an incentive-based system of

not, will the FDA require that cigarette

regulation an excise tax has distinct

manufacturers market cigarettes with the

disad antages when compared with what

safer design as aggressi ely as they

we refer to as "e

market their con entional brands?

regulation." By an

•What about the look-back

post incenti

-based

po t inc ntiv -bas d

syst m we m an a regi.m in which a h

provision? Why is the target reduction

cigarette manufactu� r is fore d to pa the

le el s t at 60%? What if the look-back

t mal co ts caused by its brand of
ciga� tt s as those costs actuall b com

provision is successful in encouraging the
industry to reduce underage smoking to
target levels but many individuals who
do not begin as underage smokers
simply picl up the habit at age 18?

PR!

1

manifest - that is, manufacturers pay

cigarette manufacturers only as the

damages ex post.

external harms caused by cigarettes

point, but it is extremely important and

actually became manifest. Thus, although

is central to our argument for an ex post

An excise tax, which can be thought

compete over safety This is a very basic

of as an "ex ante incentive-based" regime,

the regulator would be responsible for

regime (and to our critique of the

has two important disadvantages when

sorting out after the fact what harms had

proposed resolution). At best, an e cise

compared with an ex post incentive

been caused by cigarettes and should be

tax (and the de facto excise tax

based regime. First, choosing the

charged to manufacturers, it would be

contemplated in the proposed resolution)

appropriate rate of tax requires the

the cigarette manufacturers who would

would impose on each manufacturer the

regulator (as in the case of command

decide up front how to make and market

average per pack external costs for the

and-control and performance-based

cigarettes to minimize those costs.

whole industry Such a tax, however,

regulation) to have an enormous amount

The second disadvantage of an excise

provides no incentive for manufacturers

of information up front (at the time the

tax, compared with an ex post approach,

to make investments in developing and

tax rate is set) about the costs and

is that an excise tax does not create

manufacturing safer cigarette designs

benefits of cigarettes, including the costs

incentives for cigarette manufacturers to

(such as nicotine-free cigarettes or low
carcinogen cigarettes) or in identifying

and benefits of alternative cigarette
designs. In contrast, under an ex post

relatively low-risk smokers (people who

regime, costs would be imposed on

are least likely to suffer harmful effects
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tax. Again, each manufacturer would
have a strong incentive to make no such
safety-enhancing investments. This
phenomenon is a special case of what
policy scholars call the "common pool"
or "free rider" problem. We sometimes
refer to it as the "unraveling problem,"
because, under such a scenario, the
market for safety improvements may
unravel, as each manufacturer realizes
that making investments in safety
enhancements is not in its financial best
interest.

D.

The smokers' compensation
alternative
An ex post incentive-based regime

can, at least in theory, overcome the
unraveling problem associated with an
excise tax and can thereby create the
market incentives for manufacturers to
compete over safety. Such an ex post
regime can force each manufacturer to
bear the hamis caused by its brand of
cigarettes specifically and not just the
average harm caused by the industry as a

research and development costs among
others - but would provide essentially
zero benefit to that manufacturer given
that the taxes are f1.Xed (or, if variable, are
assessed on a market share basis).
lf the taxes are fixed, then, of course,
nothing that a manufacturer does can
lower them. Even if the taxes vary to
reflect the changes in the average costs of
cigarettes, however, manufacturers vvill
not invest to lower those costs because

�

the benefit of su h investment would be
shared with the whole industry in the

form of a reduced industry-wide excise

occurred rather than on speculation
regarding possible future harms.
• Manufacturers, rather than
regulators, would conduct the ex ante
cost-benefit analysis regarding what
safety investments to make, what
product design changes to consider, and
how those changes will affect product
demand.
• Costs would be imposed on
manufacturers on a brand-specific, rather
than on a fixed, industry wide, or market
share basis.
• Incentives to compete over
increased safety would be created, rather
than dulled or eliminated.
•Victims of smoking-caused harm
themselves would voluntarily come
forward with information regarding
harms caused by cigarettes, thereby
providing useful information regarding
brand-specific risks.
The smokers' compensation system

whole. To achieve that goal, one of the
essential elements of any ex post

liability law - another ex post incentive

incentive-based regime would be an

based regime. Under the current rules,

ability, even if imperfect, to trace harms

products liability law is the only existing

The specific form of ex post incentive

would cost a manufacturer money - the

evidence of actual harms after they have

can also be distinguished from products

to specific brands.

from smoking) . Any such innovations

• Fact finding with regard to harms
caused by cigarettes would be based on

ex post incentive-based regulation of
cigarettes. Some commentators complain,

based regulation that we will emphasize

however, that that regime has been

here is a regime that we call "smokers'

wholly ineffective, a complaint we

compensation." One of many possible

challenge below. Other commentators

versions of such a system would rely on

and industry officials may worry that

a newly created administrative board

products liability law, in its current form,

with authority to adjudicate the

presents the tobacco industry with an

compensation claims. Someone suffering

unacceptable level of uncertainty as to

from a smoking-related illness would

what the industrys overall liability for

bring a claim to that board and present

smoking-caused harm will be. It is also

evidence regarding his or her injury and

sometimes argued that the tort system

smoking history. If necessary causal links

entails relatively high administrative costs

were established, the board would award

compared to other systems of deterrence.

compensation to the claimant and then

In response to such conceITlS, consider

charge the manufacturer or

the following ways in which the

manufacturers for the amount paid out.

proposed smokers' compensation model

But, whatever form it might take, a

might be cheaper, simpler, and more

smokers' compensation system is

certain than its tort law alternative:

distinguishable from an excise tax in the
follovving ways:

• The fact finding determination
would be conducted by an administrative
board or an administrative law judge
rather than by a lay jury.
• This fact finder could be specially
trained in dealing with scientific
evidence, or could be authorized to
solicit advice from experts or a blue
ribbon panel of scientists.
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• The damages for ea h typ of
sm king-caused harm could be pre
determined based on some typ
f grid
s stem, whereby a gi en harm pr du es
a gi en (i.e. , certain) 1
1 of damag
payment from the manufa turer.

• The only fact finding question
ould be causation. Hence there would
be no need for expensi e fact finding on
such questions as product defect,
industry standards assumption of risk,
and the like.

• Although the need for litigation in
hard cases would not be eliminated, the
claims adjustment process could become
more routinized than is the case with
current product liability claims, thereby
reducing administrati e costs.
If the above-listed aspects of the
proposal do not provide enough
certainty, it might be possible to impose
an overall cap or budget on the amount
of damages that can be paid by the
cigarette industry in a gi en year, so long
as the damage payments within that cap are

allocated among manufacturers according to
each company's relative causal share of the
harm, and not just according to market share.
This has been a necessarily sketchy
outline of a smokers' compensation
approach to regulating cigarettes. We
have made no effort here to work out all
the details of such a program, nor do we
expect that that task will prove easy
Still, there are a variety of ways in which
such a regulatory regime might be
adjusted or tailored without eliminating
its beneficial effects. We would note,
moreover, that there are existing
regulatory regimes to which policy
makers may usefully look for guidance
regarding how to implement a smokers'
compensation regime. The most obvious
analogy, given the name we have chosen,
is workers' compensation. Another
analogy would be no-fault automobile
insurance. The smokers' compensation
regime that we have in mind, after all, is
essentially a no-fault system with the
cigarette companies acting as the insurers
of smoking-caused harms.
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OBJECTIONS

have substantial cigarette tariffs. That

public health. But if the goal were to

ex post incentive-based system, such as a

evasion strategy would be less effective

force individuals to own up to, or take

smokers' compensation system,

under a smokers' compensation system

responsibility for, their actions, we are

compared to an ex ante incentive-based

because manufacturers would have to

aware of no policy response that would

system of regulation, such as an excise tax.

pay for the harms caused by all of their

be superior to a smokers' compensation

cigarettes, even those purchased on black

system. That'.s true for several reasons.

There are two possible objections to an

A.

as

markets. Indeed, for that reason,

Strategic avoidance
of regulatory incentives
First, an excise tax might be presumed

For starters, smokers would have to

manufacturers would have a strong

pay when purchasing each pack of

incentive to discourage the emergence of

cigarettes, in the form of higher product

superior because it would be charged as

black markets in their own cigarettes.

prices, for their right to make a claim

the cigarette is sold rather than when the

Finally, there are regulatory policies that

later, when a smoking-caused illness

injury occurs. Because, under a smokers'

could be adopted that would prevent

occurs. The arrangement is no different

compensation system, manufacturers

manufacturers from evading the threat of

from that between insureds and their

would be liable for the harms of

future liability For instance, as is

first-party insurers. Thus, smokers would

cigarettes sold many years earlier, a

provided for under the proposed

not be getting something for nothing and

smokers' compensation system would

resolution, manufacturers might be

would not be evading responsibility

arguably create opportunities for cigarette

required to put up a substantial bond, to

Indeed, the whole goal of this type of

manufacturers to evade the regulator'.s

ensure that some assets are available in

incentive-based system is not to let

incentive-creating sanctions. For

the future. Similarly, as is the case for

smokers off the hook but to force

example, after profiting for twenty years

virtually all European corporations,

smokers to take responsibility by forcing

or so, a new entrant to the cigarette

manufacturers might be required to meet

each smoker to place his money where

market might simply distribute its assets

minimum capitalization requirements,

his mouth is. Absent such a price

to its shareholders, rendering itself

which would serve the same purpose as

increase, smokers would continue to

largely immune to the threat of smokers'

a bond. Finally, as is true of automobile

disregard the substantial costs that their

compensation claims. To be sure, the

drivers in most of the states in this

smoking poses to themselves and to

manufacturer would then be bankrupted

country, cigarette manufacturers could be

others; and smokers would continue to

by the smokers' compensation claims,

required to purchase a minimum amount

have to "take responsibility" for risks that

but only after many years of profiting

of liability insurance which would cover

they were not fully aware of. Moreover,

substantially and distributing those

the costs of future potential liability

the harms caused by cigarettes are, of

profits to shareholders. Legal scholars

course, often quite serious. And even to

sometimes describe this as a "judgment
proofing" or "hit and run" strategy.
There are several reasons why such

B.

The personal responsibility
question

the extent smokers or their families

Others might object to a smokers'

costs of cigarette-caused harms, it is

receive compensation for some of the

judgment-proofing strategies are unlikely

compensation system (or to any other

to be adopted by manufacturers. For

type of victim-initiated ex post incentive

ill smoker ever fully evades the ultimate

example, sophisticated long-term

based system) on the ground that it

responsibility for her smoking decisions.
Finally, of course, smokers are not the

difficult to say that the dead or seriously

creditors would - and, in other

compensates smokers for the harms

industries, do - include covenants

caused by cigarettes and thus removes

only actors who should be accountable

prohibiting (or, more generally, increasing

from them any responsibility for their

for their actions. Under an ex post

the costliness oD such strategies. Also,

own decisions. The goal of a smokers'

incentive-based regime, tobacco

opportunities for strategic avoidance of

compensation system is to enhance

manufacturers,

regulatory incentives exist for virtually

all

too, would be forced to

bear responsibility for

their

actions.

forms of regulation. For instance,
manufacturers could avoid the effect of
an excise tax by directly or indirectly
selling their brands on black markets, as
may be common in other countries that
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which is what manufacturers have paid
in tort damages to date. Critics of the
proposed resolution are typically less
Those who are interested in the
cigarette problem might ask questions
such as: "Doesn't the proposed resolution
represent a step in the right direction?";
and "In light of the fact that the apparent
momentum in Washington to enact a
comprehensive federal regulatory
response to the cigarette problem might
die, shouldn't we embrace the proposed
resolution or something substantially
similar to it while we have the chance,
rather than be returned to the status
quo?"
In our view, the answer to both
questions is "no." Taking public health as
the overriding goal, we would, if forced
to choose, pick the status quo. To
understand why, it is necessary first to
understand that critics and supporters of
the proposed settlement share two flawed
premises, which nevertheless seem to be
dictating the terms of the policy debate.
First, both sides assume that the primary
purpose of products liability law in this
context is, not to serve public health
goals, but simply to compensate those
injured by smoking. Second, both sides
seem to agree that civil liability laws
have, to date, failed to serve that or any
other worthwhile goal. Consequently,
most participants in the debate have
indicated in one way or another that the
elimination of tort law would be no big
loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The
proponents of the proposed resolution,
for instance, point out that, even if

$368.5 billion does not cover all the
harms, past and future, caused by
cigarettes, it is a lot more than nothing,

explicit. They make their views known
either by not mentioning the effect of the
proposed resolution on tort law or by
indicating that they would not challenge
that effect if only the proposed resolution
could be adjusted to better serve public
health goals.
Arguably, however, the principal goal
of products liability law is, broadly

while product liability law has produced

speaking, public health, not compensation.

nothing is to misunderstand what

In the cigarette context in particular, the

motivated the agreement in the first

question then becomes whether the

place.

public-health goal is better achieved

It would be more accurate to claim

through products liability law or through

that administrative regulation, not tort

the types of regulation envisaged in the

law, has failed those who have been

proposed resolution. Those who would

harmed by cigarette smoking. The FDA

sacrifice products liability law to accept

has long declined to exercise its authority

the proposed resolution implicitly

in this area, presumably because of the

assume that the public health benefits of

political power of the cigarette industry

the latter would outpace the public

and because of the FDA's lack of

health benefits of the former. But,

expertise regarding how best to regulate.

perhaps because of the general anti-tort

Furthermore, it has been administrative

sentiment in this country, that

regulation that has effectively derailed

presumption has been largely

otherwise viable products liability claims

unexamined and is, for several reasons,

against cigarette manufacturers. For

highly questionable.

example, the FTC-promulgated warning

First, products liability law comes far

labels have given rise to the preemption

closer, at least in theory, to providing an

defense and greatly strengthened the

ex post incentive-based type of

assumption-of-risk defense in tort law.

regulation than any alternative form of

Those defenses have until very recently

regulation now being considered (other

proved an insurmountable barrier to tort

than the smokers' compensation regime

recovery Thus, in light of this past

we are proposing) . Moreover, products

experience with administrative

liability law could have more than just a

regulation, it is not clear that we should

theoretical impact. It is true that no

have much confidence in the expanded

substantial product liability judgments

role for administrative regulation

have been won against the tobacco

contemplated in the proposed resolution.

industry Nevertheless, products liability
law is currently in a state of flux or
disequilibrium; and the growing
likelihood of many large civil judgments
against the industry is a big part of what
pushed the industry to the negotiating
table and thus what made the $368.5
billion settlement offer possible. In other
words, to say that the settlement
agreement would produce $368.5 billion
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1

unfounded.
mix of regulatory regimes h s n by the
proposed resolution - mostly
ommand-and-control; some qualified

observation. The history of tobacco
regulation makes clear one

ery

disturbing fact. The cigarette industry
has, using a

ariety of strategies,

successfully managed to protect itself
throughout this century against any form
of meaningful regulation. By far, its most
successful strategy has been to meet the
threat of tough regulations with
preempti e, command-and-control-style,
anemic regulations. The experience with
FTC warning requirements is a case in
point. But there are many others. Within
the last several years, that practice has
been especially evident at the local level,
where the industry has supported some
state tobacco control legislation in an
effort to preempt the authority of city,
town, and county governments to
control the sale and use of tobacco. With
that historical backdrop in place, it is
illuminating to look briefly again at the
promises and the likely effects of the
proposed resolution. As will become
clear, the proposed resolution appears to

th day is that th proposed resolution
uld a c mplish precis ly what

precisely the reverse

the prop sal would er ate the illusion of

f what most policy

regulate the cigarett

regulation (at least initially) while

Moreover, it is from the tobacco

simultaneously protecting the industry

industry's perspective, ideal. In light of

and smokers from having to bear the

the industry's track record, therefore, the

costs of cigar ttes.

choice of that mix of regulatory regimes
was probably no accident.

As noted above, command-and
control is the least effective form of

Based on our analysis, we would
recommend that Congress reject the
proposed resolution and start over from
scratch, this time beginning with the

regulation in this type of setting. It

following question in mind: How can we

requires the regulator to have an

design an effective ex post incentive

enormous amount of information about

based response to the cigarette problem?

the product, information that the

In our forthcoming Yale Law journal

regulator often must rely on the industry

article (cited above), we discuss the

to provide. Insofar as the industry is the

framework for beginning that analysis,

source of the regulators information, it

although much work on the details

becomes relatively easy for the industry

remains to be done

to manipulate the process and avoid
really having to bear the costs of its

Kyle

Logue

actions. Furthermore, the regulations

Assistant Professor of Law

themselves are severely limited by the

earned his }.D. at Yale Law School, where he

inability of the regulator to anticipate

was an Olin Scholar and an articles editor for

every counter-move that the industry
might make in its attempt to thwart the
regulator - or, more accurately, to save
the money that would otherwise have to
be spent in complying with the spirit of
the regulation. As we have argued, those
criticisms certainly apply to the
control regulations. To be sure, the

long-term tobacco-industry strategy

agreement also contains some elements
of performance-based regulations, which,
in theory, might pose somewhat of a
regulatory threat to the cigarette industry

As other critics have noted and our
research shows, however, the
performance-based aspects of the

"[a] key element in achieving the Acts

settlement are rendered quite anemic by

goals will be forcing a fundamental

the substantial ex ante and ex post

change in the way the tobacco industry

loopholes and the relatively minor

does business. " With that assessment we

surcharges for failing to meet

completely agree. The proposed

performance targets.
Considering the big picture, therefore,

"provide for means to ensure that the

we have no trouble rejecting the

industry will not only comply with the

suggestion that the proposed settlement
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industry have a complished. Specifically,

settlements numerous command-and
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resolution also claims that it would
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on a grander scale - of a very successful

The proposed resolution states that
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regulati ns.

performance-based; and virtually zero e

oriented scholarship would recommend.

That brings us to our final
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Indeed, as already emphasiz d, th
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